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The United States used a combination of economic, political, and military means to effect change in Iraq. Most
notably, the United States used a buildup of security forces, the “surge”, as an intervention to stabilize Iraq.
This article uses structural change tests to determine the effect of the intervention on security and economic
metrics of success. There appears to be compelling evidence that several events may have had a direct
influence on security variables with the surge being one of the events. There is little to suggest that the
surge was the primary intervention that enhanced economic development and political order.
Published by Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
Ascertaining the effect of military stabilization efforts on economic
development and security is complex. While stability may be a
necessary condition for economic growth, it is unclear how the
transition from instability to stability translates to economic prosper-
ity and it is uncertain how an economy and stability would have
evolved without the intervention. Equally uncertain are the measures
of economic prosperity that can be used to determine the success of
stabilization efforts. In addition, military interventions are usually
used in conjunction with other political stability efforts, and isolating
the effects of the intervention may be impossible. Finally, there is no
mechanism that may be used to evaluate how the economic and
stability climate of a nation would have evolved in the absence of
military intervention. This paper investigates the effect of military
intervention efforts on economic, political, and security stability and
growth by using the “surge” in Iraq as a case study.
Since 2003, the US has recommended and followed numerous
strategies to stabilize and resolve the security, political, and economic
reconstruction needs of Iraq. The initial strategy presumed that Iraqi
security forces would be able to assume their security responsibilities
shortly after the end of the US ground offensive by the spring of 2004.
This strategy was revised when Iraqi security forces performed poorly
during an insurgent uprising. Subsequently, the US assumed
responsibility for all military and civilian efforts in Iraq. These
efforts were unsuccessful primarily due to the escalation in violence
in 2006.
The Bush administration announced a new strategy, The New Way
Forward in January 2007 in response to the deteriorating situation in
Iraq. The Administration rationalized that earlier efforts to provide se-
curity in Baghdad had failed, in part, due to an insufficient number of
US and Iraqi troops to secure neighborhoods cleared of terrorists and
insurgents. It was hoped that this strategy would stem the high level
of violence in Iraq and create an atmosphere conducive for economic
redevelopment and national political reconciliation. The New Way
Forward established that the long term goals for Iraq had not changed.
The Administration claimed that the outcome should be a unified,
democratic, independent Iraq. In the near-term, 12 to 18 months,
the key goals that the Administration stated were achievable include
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improving security conditions, developing Iraqi security forces'
capabilities and transferring security responsibilities to the Iraqi
government, facilitating Iraqi government efforts to draft, enact, and
implement key legislative initiatives, assisting Iraqi government
efforts to spend the budget, helping the Iraqi government provide
key essential services to its people, and helping Iraq maintain and
expand its oil exports. In support of this new strategy, the US
increased its military presence by over 30,000 combat and other
forces.
This study develops a model to understand the effects of the surge
on Iraq. Over the long term, a continuum is manifest in economic and
security metrics. We test for breaks in the data and relate these to
policy interventions. Specifically, we attempt to evaluate the impact
of the policy intervention manifest as the surge, on economic and
security factors. There could be a time lag or delay between the
change in policy and its materialization in metrics. Since the metrics
identified in the strategy for victory are the benchmark by which US
policy makers define success, we will use these metrics.1
Policy interventions are identified as structural breaks in the
data.2 Structural breaks result from a discrete change in the popula-
tion regression coefficients from one period to another. A statistically
significant break in the mean function of the data reflects a change in
a variable in response to policy changes. The mean shifts can be
negative, indicating a decrease in the variable, or positive, indicative
of an increase.
We take three approaches. The first assumes that the surge was
the one seminal incident that influenced events in Iraq. The date for
the surge is set exogenously for January, 2007. We test for a single
structural break in the data series using a univariate statistical
method to confirm a shift in the mean of the success metrics for
January, 2007. The second approach tests for a single structural
break in the metrics. We do not pre-determine the date of the break
allowing the test to endogenously select the date of the significant
break over the time frame. We compare the timing of the shift in
the metrics to the timing of the surge. The third approach assumes
that there could have been multiple factors, multiple undetermined
policy actions that influenced events in Iraq. The surge could
potentially be one of the policy actions. This method endogenously
identifies multiple potential dates for shifts in the data series.3
For all approaches, we define the surge as the increase in the
number of US and coalition troops on the ground in Iraq. The surge
buildup presumably commenced sometime after January 2007
when “The New Way Forward” was announced. Presumably, if the
surge was the great event that affected the political, economic, and
military stability situation in Iraq, then the data should indicate a sta-
tistically significant break or shift in policy variables in the near term
following the surge.
Examining the metrics of success, there is mixed evidence that the
surge was the one seminal event that radically altered the security
and economic situation in Iraq. There appears to be compelling
evidence that several events may have had a direct influence on the se-
curity variables with the surge being one of the events. There is no
doubt that the level of US troop and Iraqi civilian casualties
declined after the surge. However, it is unclear that the surge resulted
in the improved situation or the surge in conjunction with ongoing
ethnic cleansing, separation of the various Iraqi communities; deals be-
tween the US military and Iraqi tribes and militias stabilized Iraq. The
economic data presents less compelling evidence of responding to
events. The use of economic and financial indicators used to gauge con-
fidence in the future of Iraq surprisingly show little response in the 12 to
18 month period following the surge.
2. The conflict in Iraq
In the period leading up to the 1980s, Iraq had a relatively high
standard of living and was one of the more prosperous and econom-
ically advanced countries in the region with an economy that was
mainly oil dependent.4 The nation had a well educated and motivated
work force. In the 1980s, territorial disputes with Iran led to an 8 year
war that strained the Iraq economy. In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait but
was expelled by US led United Nations coalition forces during the Gulf
War of 1991. The Gulf War and the resulting sanctions devastated the
economy and infrastructure resulting in a massive brain drain, rapidly
deteriorating living conditions, and isolated Iraq's economy from the
rest of the world. Since the early 1980s, Iraq's economic indicators
have been trending downward. Iraq accumulated a crippling interna-
tional debt burden and witnessed declines in its gross domestic
product, chronic inflation, and a depreciated currency.5 Iraq's annual
per capita income was an estimated $2312 in 1979 but by 2001 had
dropped to $960.6
Operation Iraqi Freedom, led by the US, was launched in January
2003. US forces remained in Iraq under a United Nations mandate
until December 2008 and under a bilateral security agreement
thereafter.7 The war in Iraq has been characterized by many phases.
It rapidly changed from a conventional engagement in January 2003
to an insurgency in spring of the same year. Since spring 2003, the in-
surgency has been described in multiple ways; it has been labeled a
war of terror, a civil war, and a war of resistance to the US occupation.
The war has also been prematurely declared over and a victory an-
nounced. A major proclamation of the end of hostilities was in May
2003 when President George W. Bush declared an end to the war
while standing underneath a “Mission Accomplished” banner on the
deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln. It soon became clear that hostilities
were far from over.
By the end of 2005, due to rapidly escalating violence, President
Bush was compelled to articulate a “US National Strategy for Victory
in Iraq.”8 The strategy consisted of three integrated tracks: political,
economic, and security. The political track was to help the Iraqi
people build a national compact for democratic governance by isolat-
ing enemy elements, engaging the population in the political process,
and building sustainable political institutions. The security track was
intended to develop the Iraqis' capabilities to secure the country by
clearing areas of enemy control, holding the areas, and building
Iraqi security forces. The final track was intended to establish sound
economic foundations to restore Iraq's infrastructure, reform the
economy, and build local economic capacity. The strategy emphasized
the equal importance of the three tracks and their mutual interdepen-
dence. Table 1 summarizes the chronology of major developments in
Iraq from 2003 until 2011.
1 Appendix A of the paper contains a more detailed discussion of the metrics identi-
fied by the US Department of State and Department of Defense to gauge success in Iraq
and the data proxies used for the metrics. We do not make any judgments about the
appropriateness or efficacy of the metrics. The intent is to evaluate the results of the
surge by the same criterion used by the US State Department and Department of
Defense.
2 This approach is similar to that of intervention analysis suggested by Box and Tiao
(1975) and event study methodology MacKinlay (1997). In an application of interven-
tion analysis, Perron (1989) concludes that the 1929 crash and the 1973 oil prices had
a persistent effect on macroeconomic variables. Financial event study postulates that
events or new information have an impact on the resulting price of a firm. McQueen
and Roley (1993) examine the response of stock prices to macroeconomic news over
different stages of the business cycle. Kho et al. (2000) examine the impact of crises
and bailouts in different countries on US banks. The event of interest in this paper is
the surge and the resulting reactions are the changes in the success metrics.
3 We use the Bai and Perron (1998) methodology to test for multiple breaks at
unspecified points in the policy metrics. See Amara (2008) for an application to NATO
policy variables.
4 See Dibeh (2008) for a detailed discussion of Iraq's economy.
5 Sanford (2003).
6 Foote et al. (2004).
7 CIA World Factbook.
8 The entire text for the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq may be viewed at http://
georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_national_strategy_20051130.pdf.
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The strategy for victory identified numerous metrics to map the
progress of the three tracks. The political metrics are those set forth
in United Nations Security Resolution 1546 and the Transitional Ad-
ministrative Law and considers the number of Iraqis willing to partici-
pate in the democratic process by registering to vote and voting.9 The
security metrics consider the quality and quantity of the Iraqi units,
the number of intelligence tips received from Iraqis, the percentage of
operations conducted by Iraq units, the number of car bombs defused,
offensive operations conducted, and the number of contacts initiated
by Coalition forces. The economic indicators are defined to be GDP,
GDP per capita, exchange rate stabilization, inflation, electricity
generated and delivered, barrels of oil produced and exported, and
the number of businesses opened.10 The strategy also identified other
indicators that are essential to success but, according to the strategy,
less precise to measure such as trust in governmental institutions, ac-
ceptance of rule of law, and the extent of transparency in official
operations.
In March 2006, with the situation in Iraq rapidly deteriorating,
Congress commissioned a panel, the Iraq Study Group, led by former
Secretary of State, James Baker, and a former US Representative, Lee
Hamilton, to access the progress in Iraq and recommend policy
actions. Among other proposed courses of action, the panel called
for a phased removal of US combat troops out of Iraq and the
9 The resolution does not explicitly refer to registering to vote or voting. However, the
interpretation used in the paper is that offered in the US National Strategy document. The
actual text of the U.N. resolution can be viewed at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/N04/381/16/PDF/N0438116.pdf?OpenElement. The text of the Transitional Adminis-
trative Law can be accessed at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html.
10 Robert J. Barro (1991), Easterly and Rebelo (1993) argue that political instability
and uncertainty has a negative effect on various aspects of economic growth. Collier
and Dollar (2002) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) focus on post-conflict economic re-
covery after civil wars and conclude that there is a brief period of intense economic
growth at the conclusion of conflict. Soh (1988) investigates the interaction between
political instability and economic fluctuations in Korea and concludes that economic
conditions were influenced by political considerations.
Table 1
Chronology of developments in Iraqa.
Date Incident
19 March 2003 War starts
May 2003 President Bush declared end to major combat operations, Coalition Provincial Authority established, Iraqi army disbanded,
disestablishment of Ba'th Party
July 2003 Iraqi Governing Council established
November 2003 Coalition Provincial Authority
December 2003 Saddam Hussein captured
March 2004 Transitional Administrative Law
April 2004 First militia uprising and Fallujah, Al Anbar
June 2004 UNSCR resolution 1546, Iraq Interim Government announced and transfer of sovereign authority from Coalition Provincial
Authority to Iraq Interim Government
30 January 2005 Iraq elections of National Assembly
April 2005 Formation of Iraqi Transitional Government
15 October 2005 National Constitutional referendum
15 December 2005 Parliamentary elections for permanent constitutional government
22 February 2006 Samarra mosque bombings, Salah Al Din province
May 2006 Congress commissions Iraq Study Group, vote of confidence for Prime Minister and cabinet
September 2006 Anbar awakening (security coalition between Sunni tribes and US)
December 2006 Saddam Hussein executed
10 January 2007 New way forward (Surge) announced by President Bush
15 February 2007 Baghdad security plan
March 2007 Prime minister and President affirm support for de-Ba'athification law
July 2007 Hydrocarbon Framework Law approved by Council of Ministers
Truck bomb in northern town of Amirli kills more than 150 people
August 2007 Kurdistan Regional Government passes hydrocarbon law
More than 500 people killed by four bombs in two villages of Yazidis, in northern Iraq
Moqtada al-Sadr, announces suspension of activities by Mahdi Army for 6 months, following fighting between rival Shia
groups in Karbala
September 2007 General Petraeus in testimony before Congress recommends drawdown of US forces to pre-surge levels
British troops complete withdrawal from Basra city, with 5000 remaining based at airport
The killing in Baghdad of Iraqis by personnel of Blackwater
January 2008 Iraq parliament adopts legislation reinstating Ba'ath Party members
February 2008 Provincial Power Law approved
March 2008 US and Iraqi troops also attack Mahdi Army positions in the Sadr City area of Baghdad, and fighting spreads to other cities
June 2008 UNAMI recommendations regarding contested internal borders
August 2008 Diyala operations, Constitutional Reform Committee final report
November 2008 Iraqi parliament approves agreement with United States under which American forces will withdraw to bases from mid
2009 and leave Iraq by 2011
June 2009 US military patrols of Iraqi streets ends
August 2009 Series of bombings in Baghdad and Mosul kill at least 101 people
October 2009 Two car bombs at government ministry buildings in central Baghdad leave at least 155 people dead
December 2009 At least 112 people are killed by car bombs in Baghdad that coincide with the announcement of the date for parliamentary
elections
March 2010 Parliamentary elections produce a close result that triggers uncertainty on the formation of a new government
May 2010 At least 102 people are killed in a series of suicide bombings throughout Iraq
August 2010 US combat mission in Iraq end. 50,000 troop remain in Iraq
October 2010 Attach in Baghdad leaves 52 dead
December 2010 Parliament approves new government headed by Nuri Al Malki ending 9 months of uncertainty
January 2011 60 people killed in Tikrit outside police recruiting station
March 2011 55 people killed in Tikrit after assailants storm government offices
a Source: compiled by author from various reports on http://www.defenselink.mil/. Retrieved October 2011 and International Institute of Strategic Studies Strategic Survey on
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tssu20. Retrieved October 2011.
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imbedding of US military personnel in Iraq Army units. The Bush
administration rejected the call for a phased withdrawal of US troops
and instead, in January 2007, announced a newmilitary strategy, “The
New Way Forward in Iraq”, to end the violence and achieve stability
and security in Iraq. The administration proposed increasing the
number of US combat troops in Iraq. This strategy was commonly re-
ferred to as the “surge”. By the end of July 2007, the number of US
troops deployed in Iraq increased by 30,000 to approximately
160,000. In September of 2007, General David Petraeus, Commander
of the Multi-National Forces in Iraq, testified before congress that
the military objectives of the surge were, for the most part, achieved.
He recommended a drawdown of US forces to pre-surge levels due to
improvements in the security situation, reduction in violence and
civilian deaths and an increase in the size and capabilities of the
Iraqi forces to fill the gap.
3. Methodology
Conflict can be viewed as a form of competition or market
exchange where combatants, instead of utilizing available resources for
production and consumption, use resources to wage war and
destroy and disable assets using technology of conflict. With conflict
comes reconstruction, a process of regeneration or production of output.
Conflict and reconstruction can be considered as an ongoing continuum
punctuated by military and political interventions. The interventions
are attempts by the parties to alter the outcome of the conflict.
We consider the conflict in Iraq between the US led coalition and
the insurgency to be a struggle between two groups rationally
maximizing group utility. The insurgency and the US led coalition
compete by exerting an effort to increase the probability of winning
the conflict. The group utility – prize, income, payout, or benefit – to
the insurgency is the disruption to security, economic development,
and political stability of the US coalition in Iraq. The aggregate prize
of the US led coalition is the stability and improvement of security,
economic development, and political system of Iraq. Changes in the
benefits of either group are reflected as structural changes, a change
of equilibrium, in the security, economic, and political variables
identified as measuring progress. The US led coalition employs a
preponderance of force, the surge, an intervention, to ensure battle
success and hence increase the utility to the coalition. The question
to be answered is whether the preponderance of force has made a
difference in the outcome for Iraq.
We use single and multiple structural change models to detect struc-
tural breaks at unknown points in economic and security data for Iraq.11
The presence of a structural break confirms the existence of a statistically
significant shift or time variation to either a high or lower level in the
data. The single structural changemodels determine if the surge is indeed
responsible for any shifts or changes in the mean values of the data. The
multiple structural change models, by specifying up to five changes in
the mean of the data, will allow us to determine if factors other than
the surge caused changes in the measures variables.
We use variables specified in the US strategy as metrics for success.
These variables give us an indication of whether the surge has affected
the outcome toward a stable and functioning Iraqi state. We divide the
variable into two categories, security and economic. The strategy also
identified other indicators (mainly political) that are essential to success
but, according to the strategy, less precise to measure such as trust in
governmental institutions, acceptance of rule of law, and the extent
of transparency in official operations. We are unable to use all the
metrics specified for lack of sufficient time series data. The metrics
we disregard include GDP, inflation, electricity delivered, amount
of oil exported, the number of business opened, the quality of the
Iraqi units, the number of intelligence tips received from Iraqis, the
percentage of operations conducted by Iraq units, the number of
car bombs defused, offensive operations conducted, and the number
of contacts initiated by Coalition forces.
For security metrics, we utilize US and Coalition casualties; Iraq ci-
vilian casualties. For economic metrics, we use crude oil production;
electricity generated nationwide on the national grid; Iraq Central
Bank exchange rates and exchange rate volume for the Iraq dinar12
determined by Iraq Central Bank auction; US and Iraq 90 day treasury
bill yield differentials.13
4. Data sources
We utilize several data sets in our analysis. For Iraq civilian casual-
ties, we use the data generated by Iraq Body Count (IBC)14 which re-
cords all violent civilian deaths in Iraq from January 2003 to the
present. IBC data is drawn from media reports of violent events or
of bodies found. The information is supplemented by hospital, mor-
gue, NGO, and official figures. For the study, we utilize the minimum
number of deaths reported. The data period is from April 1, 2003, to
exclude the data from the conventional war period, to September
30, 2011. The data is aggregated by month (Fig. 1).
We use numbers reported in the Brookings Institution's Iraq Index
for the number of US and coalition troops deployed in Iraq. We use
the total Iraqi security force number that include police, National
Guard, armed forces, and border patrol (Fig. 2).
We use the Brookings Institution's Iraq Index reported
crude oil production in millions of barrels per day representing
average data for the month and the average amount of electricity
generated inmegawatts nationwide on the national grid (Figs. 3 and 4).15
The number of US and Coalition casualties comes from http://
icasualties.org aggregated by month (Fig. 5).16
We access exchange rate data and treasury bill differential rates
between the US and Iraq bills and bid ratio from the results
of auctions report on the Central Bank of Iraq website (Figs. 6, 7
and 8).17
The data can be divided into security and economic indicators. The
security indicators are the troop levels and casualty data and the
11 The single structural break tests we use are the Chow test for a pre-specified break
date and the Quandt test for an undetermined break date. Our interest is the presence
of a structureal change in the mean of the series. The corresponding model is Yi=β0+
β1Xi+β2Di(τ)+μt and Di(τ) is a binary variable equal to zero before the break and one
after the break so that Di(τ)=0 if τ≤0 and Di(τ)=1 if τ≥0. The multiple structural
break model searches for multiple break dates using procedures developed by Bai
and Perron (1998, 2003). Our interest is the presence of an abrupt structural change
in the mean of the series. As such, we apply the following multiple linear regression
with m breaks and m+1 regimes for a sample of T observations yt=x′tβ+z′tδj+μ
t=Tj−1+1,…,Tj (j=1,…, m+1)where yt is the observed dependent variable at time
t; xt (p×1), zt (q×1) are vectors of covariates and β and δt are the corresponding vec-
tors of coefficients; μt is the disturbance at time t. The break dates occur at {T1,…,Tm).
This is a partial structural change model since the parameter vector β is not subject
to shifts and is estimated using the entire sample and p≠0.
12 In early 2004, the new dinar was introduced and in line with its policy of securing
exchange rate stability, auctions were used by the central bank to peg the dinar's ex-
change rate to the US dollar. The daily foreign exchange auctions are open to all com-
petitive bidders. The central bank uses the auction system to maintain exchange-rate
stability, which is one of its declared policy goals. We include the exchange rate as
an economic measure of success since it is one of the metrics identified by US State
Department and Department of Defense.
13 Financial instruments are ideal for intervention analysis. Financial markets are ef-
ficient and respond instantly to shocks or information and constitute the subjective
evaluation of many market participants.
14 More details regarding data collection methodology is available at http://www.
iraqbodycount.org/about/.
15 The August, 2011 version of Iraq Index is used.
16 Data retrieved September/2011 from http://icasualties.org/Iraq/index.aspx.
17 Daily data from http://www.cbi.iq/pdf/C.B.I.%20FOREIGN%20EXCHANGE%20AUCTIONS.
pdf is aggregated by averaging exchange rate data and summing exchange rate
volume.
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economic indicators are a measure of progress toward economic sta-
bility and growth.
5. The surge as the primary intervention
This section is divided into three subsections discussing the results
for the casualty, troop level, and economic variables. Each subsection
discusses the results of the Chow test for a single structural break
with a pre-specified break date of January, 2007 reflecting the stated
surge date; the results for the Quandt test for an unknown break date
are presented in each subsection following the Chow test. Table 2
presents the data for the results of the Chow and Quandt tests.
5.1. Casualties
Iraq civilian casualties for the conflict from April, 2003 to July,
2011 are 108,565. The number of coalition forces killed is 362 and
the number of US fatalities is at 4430 for the same period. We analyze
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Fig. 1. Iraq civilian casualties.
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the coalition deaths together with the US troop deaths due to the low
coalition numbers.
The Chow test for the Iraq casualties, US troops and US and Coali-
tion troops killed is not significant at the stated surge date. However,
the Chow test for a break date of January, 2007 is significant at the 5%
level for the US troops wounded, numbering 32,159 for the period.
The average monthly number of US troops wounded before the
surge is 506 and drops to 162 following the surge.
The Quandt test is significant for all the casualty variables.
The break dates for the casualty variables range from May,
2008 to July, 2008—17 to 19 months after the surge. Interestingly,
the break dates for all the casualty data are clustered in the
same period and the averages for the variables are lower after the
break.
In reviewing the results of the two single structural break tests, it
is worth noting that the reduction in casualties appears to
be significant at a lag of 17 months after the surge. It appears that
the direct effect of the surge on the casualty levels in Iraq was
minimal.
5.2. Troop levels
The Chow test is significant at the 1% level for the Coalition troops
and Iraq force level and not significant for the US troop level.
The Quandt test is significant at the 1% level for all three troop
levels. The break for the Coalition troop level is in December, 2006,
close to the surge date of January, 2007. The break is indicative of
a draw down in coalition troops from a monthly average of 23,425
before the break, to an average of 9166 post-break. The level of the
coalition troops is in a steady decline following the break. The
coalition troops could not have played a role in the outcome of
the surge. However, the Iraq force levels reflect a ramping
up of the troops from an average of 152,718 to 526,634
following a break at June, 2006. Interestingly, the US troop level
is significant at a break date of May, 2010 reflecting a drawdown
of troops.
It would appear that the level of US troops in Iraq fluctuated
around 140,000 before the break in May, 2010 and around 62,000
after the break. The level of troops before the surge announcement
in January, 2007 reached levels similar to those after the surge and
prior to the drawdown. If we examine Fig. 2 for the US troop levels,
it appears that there are periodic spikes in the level of the US troops
at different time frames and possibly in response to policy concerns
in the theater in Iraq. For example, the level of US troops spikes in
June, 2004 following the uprisings in Fallujah and Al-Anbar and
again in January, 2005 coinciding with the elections for the National
Assembly.
5.3. Economic variables
The Chow test is significant for all economic variables except
the treasury bills bid ratio. Electricity generation is significant at
the 5% level and the remaining variables are significant at the 1%
level.
The Quandt test is significant for all economic variables except
crude oil production. Electricity generation is significant with a
break in November, 2008. The mean after the break, 6013 MW, is
higher than before, 3943 MW. Upon closer inspection, it appears
that the amount of electricity generated fluctuated between approxi-
mately 3200 and 4800 MW up to November, 2008. It may be the case
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Fig. 3. Crude oil production.
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that electricity supplied to consistently secure areas constitutes the
bulk of what is generated. After the break, the amount generated
increased and did not drop below 5000.18
Iraq Dinar/USD exchange rates are highly significant at one
percent in January, 2007 the date of the surge. The exchange rate
improves following the surge indicating confidence in the prospects
of the Iraq currency. It is unclear what may have caused
the improvement in exchange rates in January, 2007 since
the security situation was quite bleak prior directly following the
execution of Saddam Hussein in December, 2006 and during the
surge.19 However, themarketsmay have anticipated the positive im-
pact of the surge in stabilizing the nation. The exchange rate
volume is significant at the 1% level in March, 2008 reflecting a
higher demand for currency. The higher volume could reflect the
market's actual need for currency as a result of improving economic
conditions (Fig. 9).
18 The Brookings Institution Iraq Index, August, 2011 estimates that 56% of the de-
mand for electricity in Iraq was met in 2011.
19 The improvement in the Iraq Dinar/USD exchange rate in the months prior to the
surge could reflect an increase in demand for the dinar in preparation for the surge.
The author was unable to locate information to substantiate the explanation. However,
Steven Simon (2008) refers to the payments from the US to tribal sheiks and combat-
ants in exchange for allegiance and cooperation for the Anbar awakening. In addition,
International Monetary Fund (2008) reports a 33% increase in reserve money and dou-
bling of demand and time deposits for the Iraq dinar in 2006 and 2007.
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Fig. 6. Iraq Dinar to the USD.
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The treasury differentials have a significant break in October, 2006
before the commencement of the surge. The differentials are an
indication of what it takes the Iraq government to attract buyers to
its securities and reflect the risk above the US security rates that
buyers are taking in investing in Iraq. However, the mean after the
break is higher indicating low confidence in Iraq's prospects.
The bid ratio indicates the preference for government securities or
the level of demand for the securities. It is an indication of how many
more or less people want to buy the treasury bills than actually bought
them. The break is significant and occurs in September, 2009, 33 months
following the surge with the mean after the break lower than pre-break.
Examining the economic metrics of success, there is little evidence
that the surge was the one seminal event that radically altered
the security and economic situation in Iraq.20 Both the Chow and Quandt
tests identify breaks that are significant for five of the six economic vari-
ables. However, themeanafter the break for the treasurydifferentials and
bills bid ration reflect pessimism in the economic outlook.
6. Surge as one policy action of multiple possible events
This section is divided into three subsections discussing the results
for the casualty, troop level, and economic variables using the multi-
ple structural break model developed by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003).
Table 3 presents the data for the results of the test.
6.1. Casualties
The variables: US troops wounded, US troops killed, and US and
Coalition troops killed have a significant break and downward trend
in July/August, 2007—a 6 month lag after the announcement of the
surge in January, 2007. The means following the break are lower for
all the variables.
Interestingly, Iraq civilian casualty data indicate a significant break
in May, 2008 coinciding with a break in US troops killed. The means
after the break are lower than the means before the break. This date
coincides with the break dates that the Quandt test identified. A sec-
ond break for the Iraq civilian casualties takes place in August, 2009.
The mean following the break is lower. However, the breaks are
weakly significant at the 10% level.
None of the break dates identified by the multiple break tests are
at January, 2007.
6.2. Troop levels
The multiple break tests for the Coalition troop levels indicate
three breaks significant at the 5% level occurring in December,
2005; August, 2006; July, 2008. The means following the break are
lower than the means preceding the breaks. This reflects the constant
drawdown and declining commitment of the number of coalition
troops to the Iraq effort. Of interest, is the fact that two of the down-
ward breaks for the coalition occur prior to the surge. As the violence
in Iraq increased, the coalition nations increasingly removed their
troops from harm's way and ended their commitment to Iraq.21 The
brunt of the responsibility for the surge was by US troops.
The Iraq force level variable has a single break at the 1% level in
August, 2006. The mean following the break is higher than that pre-
ceding the break. The date coincides closely with the date identified
by the Quandt test.
The US troop level data breaks in January, 2010. The break reflects
the drawing down of US troop in Iraq. The Quandt test also identifies
a break date that reflects the troop drawdown in May, 2010. Neither
test identifies a break associated with the ramping up of US troops
for the surge.
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20 Greenstone (2008) compares the outcome in Iraq in the period before the surge to
the period after the surge by testing for changes in the mean for variables in the two
time periods. He assumes that the impact of the surge is on February 14, 2007. He also
utilizes two start dates for beginning the analysis, 1 year and 1.5 years before February
14 to include the bombing of the Mosques in Samarra.
21 The vast majority of the coalition forces were stationed in the relatively peaceful
south and engaged primarily in training, support, and reconstruction missions. Their
presence for the most part may have been symbolic. See http://www.cfr.org/
publication/9340/coalition_of_the_willing.html.
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6.3. Economic variables
Crude oil production, electricity generation, exchange rate vol-
ume, and treasury differentials have multiple breaks. In the case of
crude oil production, the first break occurs before the surge; the
second break coincides closely with that indentified by the single
structural break test in August/September 2007.
Electricity generation exhibits two breaks. The first in May, 2007
shortly after the surge and the second coincides with the break
identified by the Quandt test in October/November 2008. The
exchange rate indicated one break in December, 2009. The exchange
rate volume exhibits four breaks, one of which occurs before the
surge in February, 2006. The treasury differentials have two breaks
in February, 2009 and May, 2010. The treasury bid ratio has a single
break in July, 2009 which coincides closely with the break resulting
from the Quandt test in September, 2009.
The economic variables present a mixed picture regarding the ef-
fect of the surge on the economic prospects for Iraq. The breaks for
electricity production and exchange rates are weakly significant at
the 10% level. The post-break means for the treasury differentials
and bid ratio are lower than the pre-break means. Breaks for the
crude oil production and exchange rate volume occur before January,
2007. There are no economic variables with unambiguous improve-
ments over the time period. The only economic variable that has a
break close to January, 2007 is a weakly significant electricity gener-
ation variable in May, 2007.
There appears to be compelling evidence that several events may
have had a direct influence on the security variables with the surge
being one of the events. Again, the economic data presents less com-
pelling evidence of responding to events.
7. Conclusion
The effect of the war in Iraq has been enormous in terms of loss of
human life, destruction of infrastructure, and disruption of social
norms. Billions of dollars have been spent in fighting the war and
on reconstruction efforts. In an attempt to stabilize Iraq, the Bush
administration implemented a strategy dubbed The NewWay Forward
in January 2007. This strategy increased the number of US troops in
Iraq in the hope that reducing violence would reduce casualty rates
and in turn would lead to political and economic stability. It may
not be possible to separate out the effect on Iraq of policy interven-
tions other than the surge; nor is it a simple task to determine what
constitutes good measures of progress.
This study applies structural break analysis to Iraq security and
economic data in order to determine the surge's effect on stabilizing
the nation. The surge did have an effect of Iraq. However, the pre-
surge violence appears to have had more of a disrupting effect. It ap-
pears that the surge took the country back to pre 2006 conditions, be-
fore the rapid escalation in violence. There is mixed evidence to
suggest that the surge was the seminal event influencing the econom-
ic development and security of Iraq.
For the thirteen variables examined, the results for the test where
the break date is set exogenously at January, 2007, indicate that five
variables are not significant and two variables post-surge values indi-
cate deteriorating conditions. For the single break test that selects the
break date endogenously: one variable has a break in January 2007;
three variables have a significant break within a 3 month lag of the
surge; three variables indicating a break in the time period preceding
the surge; the remaining variables indicate breaks at a period of at
least 18 months after the surge. The multiple structural breaks test
has two variable at only 10% significance; four breaks before the
surge; seven within 12 month lag of the surge; the remaining breaks
occur at a lag greater than 12 months. The economic metrics provide
less support for the influence of the surge than the security variables.
Quite possibly the most important piece of missing economic data is
the money that was used directly by US forces on the ground. This
economic incentive is not accounted for. In addition, the economic
variables used to measure progress may be too slow to respond to
changes in policy. Some other economic variables that are directly
and rapidly impacted by events on the ground may be a better
Table 2
Single structural break.
Metric Quandt test:
Wald statistic
Quandt test:
Break date
Chow test:
Break 2007:01
Casualties
Iraq civilian casualties 38.9*** 2008:06 1.4
US troops wounded 27.60*** 2008:07 4.9**
US troops killed 25.7**** 2008:05 1.5
US and coalition killed 26.3*** 2008:07 1.4
Troop levels
Coalition troop level 16.1*** 2006:12 23.0***
Iraq force level 49.0*** 2006:06 129.6***
US troop level 29.0*** 2010:05 1.1
Economic variables
Crude oil production
(M barrels)
5.5 2007:9 11.9***
Electricity (MW) 100.2*** 2008:11 82.9**
Exchange rates
(Iraq Dinar/USD)
265.5*** 2007:01 1305.0***
Exchange rate volume
(1000 USD)
12.0*** 2008:03 113.7***
Treasury differentials 14.8*** 2006:10 13.0***
Treasury bills bid ratio 7.6*** 2009:09 1.4
⁎ Denotes that the null is rejected at the 10% significance level.
⁎⁎ Denotes that the null is rejected at the 5% significance level.
⁎⁎⁎ Denotes that the null is rejected at the 10% significance level.
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Fig. 9. Exchange rate volume.
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gauge of progress. The surge may have achieved some goals of
relative security. What remains to be seen is if the surge contributed
to the stated long term strategic and political goals of the war, an
economical strong, unified, democratic, independent Iraq.
Appendix A
The US Department of State and Department of Defense have
identified measures of security and stability to gauge success in Iraq.
The Department of State provides a weekly status report for the
eight key areas identified as pillars of US Government policy at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization. These areas are:
– Political
Governance and Legislation: Lists development in the govern-
ment, key legislation, Iraq refugee update, and an outline of the
government structure.
– Security
Situation Update: A description of security incidents in Iraq in-
cluding insurgency activity and law enforcement.
Security Transition: A list of transitions of functions to Iraqi secu-
rity personnel and a breakdown of the number and functionality
of the Iraqi security forces.
– Economic
Economic and Government Capacity Update: An update on
changes in government capacity and services.
Oil: Crude oil production and export. Refined product supplies of
diesel, kerosene, LPG, gasoline available in the Iraq market.
Essential Services: Electricity supplied on the national grid. Update
on services such as road construction and airline services.
Economic Indicators: Inflation, Iraq commercial bond price and
yield and Iraq central bank currency auction (USD sold and ex-
change rates).
– Diplomatic
Political Engagement: Developments in the political arena such as
state visits and embassy inaugurations.
The Department of Defense provides Measuring Stability and
Security in Iraq report at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/ that
includes specific performance indicators and measures of progress to-
ward political, economic, and security stability in Iraq, as directed by
congressional legislation.22 The report measures divide progress into
two major categories: Stability and Security and Iraqi Security Forces
Training and Performance.
Stability and Security is further divided into: Political Stability,
Economic Activity, Security Environment, and Transferring Security
Responsibility and Responsible Drawdown of Forces.
– Political Stability: Evaluates efforts toward Iraq national unity, Po-
litical Commitments, Government Reform, and International
Issues.
– Economic Activity: Summarizes the fiscal and economic environ-
ment by reporting on Budget Execution, Debt Relief, Indicators of
Economic Activity, Oil Industry, Agriculture, and Essential Services.
– Security Environment: Assesses the Overall Assessment of the
Security Environment, Attack Trends and Violence, Insurgent and
Militant Group, Security Assessments by Region, Public Percep-
tions of Security.
22 Section 9204 of the Supplemental Appropriations Act for 2008, Public Law 110-252
and Section 316 of the Supplemental Appropriations Act for 2009, Public Law 111-32.1
and also submitted pursuant to Section 1508(c) of the Department of Defense Autho-
rization Act for 2009, Public Law 110-417.
Table 3
Multiple structural breaks.
Metric Double Max test Test Significance Break
date
Mean before/after
break
Udmax Wdmax
Casualties
Iraq civilian casualties 318.3⁎⁎⁎ 514.0⁎⁎⁎ Sequential 10% 2008:05
2009:08
1498/1273
1273/335
US troops wounded 93.8⁎⁎⁎ 211.0⁎⁎⁎ Sequential 1% 2007:07 514/102
US troops killed 94.0⁎⁎⁎ 191.0⁎⁎⁎ Sequential 1% 2007:08
2008:05
69/24
24/7
US and coalition killed 43.6⁎⁎⁎ 95.7⁎⁎⁎ Sequential 1% 2007:8 74/14
Troop levels
Coalition troop level 36.6⁎⁎⁎ 74.6⁎⁎⁎ SupF 5% 2005:12
2006:08
2008:07
23,425/19,290
19,290/11,667
11,667/4998
Iraq force level 34.7⁎⁎⁎ 86.8⁎⁎⁎ SupF 1% 2006:08 156,541/449,961
US troop level 97.5⁎⁎⁎ 200.3⁎⁎⁎ Sequential 1% 2010:01 140,847/62,820
Economic variables
Crude oil production
(M barrels)
19.04⁎⁎⁎ 25.0⁎⁎⁎ SupF 1% 2004:05
2007:08
1.76/2.11
2.11/2.5
Electricity (MW) 58.9⁎⁎⁎ 158.9⁎⁎⁎ Sequential 10% 2007:05
2008:10
3763/4391
4391/5983
Exchange rates
(Iraq Dinar/USD)
277.0⁎⁎⁎ 500.0⁎⁎⁎ SupF 10% 2009:12 1413/1190
Exchange rate volume (1000 USD) 49.7⁎⁎⁎ 69.2⁎⁎⁎ Sequential 1% 2006:02
2007:12
2009:08
2010:02
411,675/925,525
925,525/1,456,271
1,456,271/2,743,052
2,743,052/3,097,529
Treasury differentials 74.7⁎⁎⁎ 186.9⁎⁎⁎ SupF 1% 2009:02
2010:05
9.64/6.63
6.63/8.46
Treasury bills bid ratio 19.1⁎⁎⁎ 19.1⁎⁎⁎ Sequential 1% 2009:07 1.33/0.82
⁎ Denotes that the null is rejected at the 10% significance level.
⁎⁎ Denotes that the null is rejected at the 5% significance level.
⁎⁎⁎ Denotes that the null is rejected at the 1% significance level.
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– Transferring Security Responsibility and Responsible Drawdown
of Forces: Evaluates the focus of US forces in shifting to mentoring
and advising the ISF and away from taking a directive role in
security by Drawdown of US Forces, Release of Detainees, Risk
Levels, Status of the Coalition and the NATO Training Mission—
Iraq.
– Iraqi Security Forces Training and Performance: Evaluates assessed
capabilities of the Iraqi Forces, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of
Defense, and Iraqi National Counter-Terrorism Force.
– Ministry of Interior: Progress in developing institutional ministeri-
al capability in Police Services, Federal Police, Directorate of
Border Enforcement and Ports of Entry Directorate, Oil Police,
and Facilities Protection Services.
– Ministry of Defense: Progress in developing a sustainment and
operational plan for Ministry of Defense and Joint Headquarters,
Iraqi Army, Iraqi Air Force, Iraqi Navy.
For the study, we use measures that are quantifiable and are col-
lected on a regular basis – during the time period studied – to allow
for the construction of a time series. These are US, Coalition, and
Iraq troops; Iraq casualties nationwide and by province; US wounded
and casualties; US and coalition casualties; Crude oil production;
electricity generated on the national grid; Iraq dinar to USD exchange
rate and volume; Iraq treasury bill yield and bid ratio. We do not
make any judgments about the applicability or efficacy of the selected
measures.
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